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ESSA YS
PUBLIC LIFE AND HOSTILITY TO RELIGION
Frederick Mark Gedicks*
M ANY who value the contributions of religion to American life
have contended that American politics and public life are hos-
tile to religion. This, for example, is the premise of Richard Neu-
haus's widely read book, The Naked Public Square.' Others have
made similar observations and arguments, especially about the legal
academy.2 The United States Supreme Court's Religion Clause opin-
ions are widely perceived to be hostile to religion,' and anecdotes
* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. J.D.,
University of Southern California. I wish to thank Dan Conide, Nancy Ehrenreich, Jim
Gordon, Bill Marshall, Steve Smith, and Mark Tushnet for their review and criticism of earlier
drafts of this Essay. Christine Stone Jepson provided excellent research assistance. I am
especially indebted to my friend Ted Blumoff, whose persistent, skeptical questioning of the
hostility thesis pushed me to attempt a systematic defense of it. An earlier version of this
paper was delivered at the Third Annual Symposium on Law, Religion, and Ethics at Hamline
University School of Law on October 26, 1990.
1 Richard J. Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America (2d
ed. 1986).
2 See, e.g., Frederick M. Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Choosing the Dream: The Future of
Religion in American Public Life (Contributions to the Study of Religion No. 32, 1991);
Gerard V. Bradley, Dogmatomachy-A "Privatization" Theory of the Religion Clause Cases,
30 St. Louis U. L.J. 275 (1986); Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating
Religion as a Hobby, 1987 Duke L.J. 977; David M. Smolin, The Judeo-Christian Tradition
and Self-Censorship in Legal Discourse, 13 U. Dayton L. Rev. 345 (1988); Peter L. Berger,
Religion in Post-Protestant America, Commentary, May 1986, at 41.
For observations about the legal academy, see, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions
and Political Choice 5-6 (1988); Michael J. Perry, Morality, Politics, and Law 10, 211 n.10
(1988); Roger C. Cramton, Beyond the Ordinary Religion, 37 J. Legal Educ. 509 (1987); Rex
E. Lee, The Role of the Religious Law School, 30 Vill. L. Rev. 1175 (1985); Steven D. Smith,
Book Review, 8 Const. Commentary 227, 228-29 (1991).
3 See Herbert McClosky & Alida Brill, Dimensions of Tolerance 133-35 (1983) (suggesting
that most Americans agree with the principle of separation of church and state but disagree
with the Supreme Court's application of this principle in particular cases); see also Gerard V.
Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine
That Has Gone of Itself, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 674, 739 (1987) ("The judiciary's church-
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about the antireligious hostility of public life are common.4 More-
over, studies suggest that some of the principal actors in American
public life systematically marginalize religious viewpoints relative to
secular ones. Regardless of the evidence, many religious people
clearly feel excluded and alienated from public life.'
Despite this strongly felt perception by some, others are baffled by
the suggestion that American public life discriminates against reli-
gion.7 Some adduce as contrary evidence that religion is deeply (if
state principles do not resonate with popular sentiments. They seem counterintuitive to the
average citizen and the Court knows it.").
Douglas Laycock has suggested that the Court's Religion Clause jurisprudence might best
be explained by the Court's adoption of a privatization thesis, which holds that religion must
be excluded from public life. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated
Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DePaul L. Rev. 993, 1007-10 (1990). For a comprehensive
examination of this thesis and an argument that it no longer influences the Court's decisions,
see Richard Myers, The Supreme Court and the Privatization of Religion, 41 Cath. U. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 1992).
4 "Public life," as distinguished from "private life" by liberal political theory, is the main
focus of Part I of this Essay. For examples of the antireligious hostility of public life, see, e.g.,
Neuhaus, supra note 1, at 97-98 (describing how the news media ignored the religious
dimension of the political activism of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.); John Dart, The Religion
Beat, in The Religion Beat: The Reporting of Religion in the Media 19, 20-21 (The Rockefeller
Found. Conference Report 1981) (observing that the religion editor of the typical urban
newspaper is a nonbeliever); Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice:
Some Further Thoughts, 39 DePaul L. Rev. 1019, 1035 (1990) (noting the marginalization of
religion in public media and intellectual life); Mark Edmundson, A Will to Cultural Power:
Deconstructing the de Man Scandal, Harper's Mag., July 1988, at 67, 69-70 (observing that
professors of English at elite universities generally believe literature has replaced religion as
the principal source of moral values).
5 See, e.g., Peter L. Benson & Dorothy L. Williams, Religion on Capitol Hill (1982)
(arguing that national media in the United States do not report on the religious beliefs of
Congress despite the fact that members of Congress are as religious as the general population);
Ellis Sandoz, A Government of Laws: Political Theory, Religion, and the American Founding
(1990) (arguing that scholars of the American founding era generally have ignored religious
influences); Paul C. Vitz, Religion and Traditional Values in Public School Textbooks: An
Empirical Study, in Equity in Values Education: Do the Values Education Aspects of Public
School Curricula Deal Fairly With Diverse Belief Systems?, Final Report § 1, pt. 2 (July 1985)
(arguing that American public school textbooks ignore the influence of Christianity and
Judaism in history).
6 See Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 2, at 29-32, 82-83.
7 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Religion in Politics, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1131 (1989) (reviewing
Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice (1988)).
I confess to some puzzlement at this claim about the culture of the contemporary
United States, which seems to me far less hostile to religion, even in the abstract heights
inhabited by intellectuals, than Greenawalt suggests .... To the admittedly modest
extent that the Supreme Court accurately reflects general cultural trends, [its Religion
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controversially) involved in contemporary American politics.' Others
flatly deny that any hostility to religion, outside of a few isolated
instances, exists in American public life.9 Still others suggest that the
perception of hostility comes from mere misunderstanding. 10 And if
religion seems uniquely disabled in public life by the Supreme Court's
construction of the Establishment Clause, that seems to many a fair
trade-off for the unique benefits conferred upon religion by the Free
Exercise Clause."
Clause doctrine] does not seem to me to show that suspicion of religious motivations for
legislation pervades our culture.
Id. at 1134-35.
8 See, e.g., Theodore Y. Blumoff, Disdain for the Lessons of History: Comments on Love
and Power, 20 Cap. U. L. Rev. 159 (1991).
There is a striking tendency among those who call for a more central locus for
religion in American political life to lead with their chins. It is as if they had missed the
last three decades: the Moral Majority, the Reverends Billy Graham, Martin Luther
King, Jesse Jackson, Pat Robertson, Jerry Falwell, Theodore Hesburgh and others-all
have taken their turns in the political limelight, advising Presidents, broadening the
accepted range of public responses to emotionally charged, moral/religious issues,
pulling the entire political spectrum far to the right during the 1980s, and even defining
party platforms and politics. Religion is today and always has been thoroughly
admixed in American politics, and this despite the long prevailing liberal ethos.
Id. at 186-87 (footnote omitted); see also Tushnet, supra note 7, at 1135 n.17 (noting the
religious motivations that often lie behind opposition to abortion).
9 See, e.g., William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free
Exercise Exemption, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 357, 407-11 (1989-90); Oliver S. Thomas,
Comments on Papers by Milner Ball and Frederick Gedicks, 4 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub.
Pol'y 451, 453 (1990).
10 See, e.g., David A.J. Richards, Toleration and the Constitution 141 (1986) ("[The]
different concerns of the religion clause do not.., place them in the kind of hostility that
many commentators imagine when they call for exclusive emphasis on either anti-
establishment or free exercise."); Marshall, supra note 9, at 407 ("[Ihe inability to capture the
essence of religion in a logical medium is not hostility to religion .... "); id. at 409 ("An
approach which treats religious beliefs as equal to non-religious beliefs cannot be characterized
as hostile to religion; there is no antagonism in equal treatment."); Ellis West, The Case
Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 591,
636 (1990) ("[A]n argument against a right to religion-based exemptions is not an argument
against religion.").
II See Tushnet, supra note 7, at 1134-35; West, supra note 10, at 616-17. Whatever might
have been made of this argument during the erosion of free exercise rights in the 1980s-see,
e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); O'Lone v.
Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)-little seems to remain of it after Employment Div.,
Dep't Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which held that the Free Exercise
Clause does not mandate religious exemptions from generally applicable laws even when such
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These conflicting empirical claims cannot be resolved without
agreement on the nature of the problem presented by religion in pub-
lic life. I want to demonstrate in a more precise way how American
public life is hostile to religion. Like so much else, the hostility of
public life to religion can be traced to one of the conceptual founda-
tions of liberal political theory: the distinction between public and pri-
vate life. I will start with a sketch of this distinction in American
liberal thought12 and follow it with a discussion of how the distinction
enables liberals to marginalize religion in public life. 13 Next, I will
show how this marginalization surfaced in two recent Supreme Court
opinions.1 4 I will close with some observations about the significance
of recognizing that American public life is hostile to religion.15
I.
The impulse to divide society into mutually exclusive public and
private spheres derives from the Lockean tradition of natural rights.
In that tradition, citizens are thought to have inalienable rights
against government that are held independently of the state.16 Under
a Lockean political regime, the reach of permissible government
action (public life) depends on the boundaries of the inviolable sphere
of individual rights (private life).17
Conceptually, the presence or absence of individual free will marks
the boundary between the public and private spheres.18 The division
of society into public and private spheres thus mirrors the fundamen-
tal division in Western thought between subject and object. 19 In pri-
laws severely burden religious practice and are not justified by a compelling state interest. See
infra Part III.B for a discussion of Smith.
12 See infra Part I.
13 See infra Part II.
14 See infra Part III.
15 See infra Part IV.
16 See John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil
Government, in Treatise of Civil Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration 3, 89-94
(Charles L. Sherman ed., Irvington Publishers, Inc. 1965).
17 See Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in The Politics of Law
13, 17 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990).
Is See Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1151, 1196-97
(1985). The importance of individual free will to the boundary between public and private life
has been implicit (and, at times, explicit) in natural law theory since the middle ages. See J.G.
Merquior, Liberalism: Old and New 18-23 (1991).
19 See Peller, supra note 18, at 1199, 1215, 1265.
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vate life, subjectivity and passion hold sway. Individuals are free to
do whatever they please for any reason (or for no reason) as long as
they do not harm anyone else.20 Value choices need not be defended
by publicly accessible reasons because private behavior is assumed to
be the result of desire, which is beyond rational or empirical
analysis.21
Public life, on the other hand, is the realm of objectivity and reason.
In this realm, government and individuals must serve the collective
"public interest" rather than the idiosyncratic tastes and preferences
of any individual.22 Value choices must be rationally defended in
public life, for unlike private actions, public actions cannot be justified
by mere appeal to an individual's tastes or preferences. Indeed, once
positivism eclipsed natural rights in American jurisprudence, public
life constrained the pursuit of these tastes and preferences, constitut-
ing the objective limitation of the social world imposed upon the sub-
jective freedom of the individual.23  As a consequence, actions in
public life must be justified empirically or rationally, by reference to
the observable and explainable phenomena of the exterior world.24
The border between public and private life is neither peaceful nor
stable. For liberal political theory, private life poses the threat of sub-
version of the institutions and actors of public life to some set of idio-
20 See Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch, The Public-Private Distinction in American
Law and Life, 36 Buff. L. Rev. 237, 237, 243 (1987); Note, Reinterpreting the Religion
Clauses: Constitutional Construction and Conceptions of the Self, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1468, 1471
(1984).
21 See Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies 61-62, 127 (1987); Roberto M.
Unger, Knowledge and Politics 42-43 (1975).
22 See Freeman & Mensch, supra note 20, at 237, 243.
23 See Louis M. Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a
Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1006, 1015 (1987)
("[Mlost modern constitutional law can be reduced to a series of rules prohibiting government
interference with nongovernmental power centers.").
24 See, e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Crisis of Democratic Theory 242 (1973)
(McCarthyism represented to American intellectuals "moralism, ideology, religious
fundamentalism, intellectual oversimplification, and irrationalism. Established social
institutions, as the other half of the contrast, inevitably appeared good. They represented
practical compromise, pragmatism, 'market decisions,' intellectual complexity, and structural
rationality."); Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law
278 (1988) ("[I]nstrumental rationality is what is taken to distinguish the public sphere, which
includes both the politics and the market and which is governed by instrumental rationality,
from the private sphere, which need not be so governed.").
1992]
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syncratic values.25 The unrestrained indulgence of individual
preferences in private life threatens political and social stability if per-
mitted in public. At the same time, whenever public life encroaches
upon private life, it threatens the pursuit of individual values.26
Accordingly, the purpose of the liberal state is to preserve the
objectivity of public life from the subjectivity of private life, while
nonetheless ensuring that there remains sufficient private space for the
pursuit of subjective values.27 The state achieves this balance by
remaining ideologically neutral-that is, staying aloof from the pur-
suit of values in private life and acting only on the basis of objective
facts.28 The rationality and deliberation of public life thus wall in and
control the passion and desire of private life, enabling society to estab-
lish its rules on the basis of ordered reason rather than violence or
caprice.29
If individual values are the function of desire, which itself cannot be
measured or explained, then no single set of values can be objectively
shown to be superior to any other set, and government must remain
neutral with respect to any individual's values.30 When liberal gov-
ernment acts based on a particular conception of the good, it deprives
individuals of the freedom to choose their own values.31 Only by stay-
ing out of such conflicts can government retain its role as neutral arbi-
25 See Seidman, supra note 23, at 1007; see also Purcell, supra note 24, at 244 (describing
Reinhold Neibuhr's view that men and women are constantly tempted to proclaim their
personal beliefs to be universally applicable); Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of
Religious Faith and Civil Religion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DePaul L. Rev. 1047,
1048-49 (1990) (arguing that confirmation hearings on Catholic nominees to the Supreme
Court evidence "a fear that the 'private' realm of religion ... will illegitimately invade the
public space of judicial decisionmaking").
26 See Seidman, supra note 23, at 1007-08.
27 Id. at 1026.
28 See Kelman, supra note 21, at 66; Joel F. Handler, Dependent People, the State, and the
Modern/Postmodern Search for the Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 999, 1060-61
(1988).
29 See Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in 3 Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, Collected
Works 146, 163 (New York ed. Int'l Publishers 1975) (1843) ("Security is the highest social
concept of civil society, the concept of police, expressing the fact that the whole of society
exists only in order to guarantee to each of its members the preservation of his person, his
rights, and his property.").
30 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 11 (1980) ("While
everybody has an opinion about the good life, none can be known to be superior to any
other.").
31 Unger, supra note 21, at 89 ("If the law applier cannot justify his decisions, because they
appear to rest on his own individual and subjective values, liberty will suffer. Those to whom
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ter of social confliCt.32 Thus, the least controversial kinds of
government actions in a liberal democracy are based on objective
facts, and the most problematic actions on subjective values.33
In American jurisprudence, however, public life has not always
enjoyed such a privileged status. In the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries, the privilege was reversed: the pursuit of personal val-
ues was thought to be the source of public life, rather than vice
versa.34 Beginning in the twentieth century, the existence of natural
or prepolitical rights assumed by liberty-of-contract jurisprudence
was vigorously challenged by the legal realists. 35 Although some real-
ists rejected the very idea of a stable and coherent division of society
into public and private spheres,36 others accepted the distinction and
sought only to reverse the priority of private life over public life.37
These "constructive" or "assimilated" realists eventually prevailed,
arguing that rights held by individuals in private life were not derived
from nature but rather were the effects of the exercise of social power
in public life.38 The contemporary assumption is that public life exists
the law is applied will have surrendered their freedom to the judge, the person authorized to
apply the rules.").
32 Id. at 73 ("The state is viewed either as above the antagonism of private values or as the
framework within which those interests are represented and reconciled. Only such an
institution can hope to frame laws that do more than embody a factional interest."); Peller,
supra note 18, at 1261 ("In the liberal vision, law is legitimate only insofar as it is impersonal
and impartial, existing outside the play of social differentiation.").
33 For example, I have suggested elsewhere that the liberal preference for objectivity is the
source of the Supreme Court's reluctance to ban nonobscene pornography, notwithstanding its
intuition that such speech is of little individual or social value. See Frederick M. Gedicks, The
Religious, the Secular, and the Antithetical, 20 Cap. U. L. Rev. 113, 130 & n.64 (1991). This
preference is also the source of the belief-action distinction in free exercise doctrine. See Note,
supra note 20, at 1471.
34 See Peller, supra note 18, at 1207-08; see also Purcell, supra note 24, at 36-38 (describing
instinct psychology). See generally Merquior, supra note 18, at 2-3 (describing nineteenth-
century liberal view that the powers of the state are limited by individual freedom); Marx,
supra note 29, at 164-68 (criticizing nineteenth-century liberalism's reduction of the state to
the protector of individual rights).
35 See Purcell, supra note 24, at 74-76, 79-80.
36 See Mensch, supra note 17, at 21.
37 Peller, supra note 18, at 1192-93; e.g., Purcell, supra note 24, at 91-92.
38 Purcell, supra note 24, at 76, 248; Mensch, supra note 17, at 21-24; Peller, supra note 18,
at 1255.
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prior to private life. The objective and material are thus privileged
over the subjective and ideal. 9
Prior to the realists, the fear was that the objectivity of public life
would co-opt individual liberty by invading private life." In the post-
realist world, the concern is that a particularist set of values will cap-
ture public life and exclude competing conceptions of the good.
Accordingly, one of the key tasks of contemporary liberal politics is to
police the boundary between public and private life by distinguishing
value from fact and desire from reason. Beliefs or values that reside
in private life are suspect as a basis for government action unless they
can be relocated in public life as facts or reasons.41 Only when con-
firmed by widely shared human experience, scientific investigation, or
reasoning from premises that can be verified by experience or investi-
gation does a belief qualify as knowledge upon which government
legitimately can act.42
II.
Religion has long been placed in American private life.43 Religious
belief in the Western tradition centers on a transcendent force or
belief-that is, a force or belief beyond the material, phenomenal
world. As such, religious belief is not subject to verification or falsifi-
cation according to the objectivist conventions of public life." Secu-
39 Peller, supra note 18, at 1250-51, 1286. But see Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, The
Politics of Virtue: Animals, Theology and Abortion, 25 Ga. L. Rev. 923, 1126 (1991) (arguing
that American culture understands social reality to be a function of private choice).
40 Peller, supra note 18, at 1263.
41 Cf. Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 24 ("In liberal theory, rationality may be contrasted with
reliance on personal intuition, feeling, commitment, tradition, and authority as bases for
judgment.").
42 See id. at 56-59; Peller, supra note 18, at 1266.
43 See Freeman & Mensch, supra note 20, at 241; Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of Decline
of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1349, 1356 (1982); Note, supra note 20,
at 1471; see also Mensch & Freeman, supra note 39, at 990 ("[The Reformation's] insistence
that salvation comes only from faith had the unintended but perhaps inevitable effect of
relegating theology to the realm of private, subjective desire.").
44 Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 2, at 64-71. This is not to say, however, as defenders of
secularized public life sometimes do, that reason and empiricism play no role in the
development and maintenance of religious faith. Compare Carter, supra note 2, at 986, 991-92
(observing that liberals often see reason and belief as mutually exclusive); Steven G. Gey, Why
Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 75 passim (1990) (asserting that religious
belief is not based on logic or reason) with Greenawalt, supra note 4, at 1021, 1029, 1032
678 [Vol. 78:671
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larism constitutes the test of residency in American public life, and
religion by its nature cannot pass the test.
Keeping religion and religious belief confined to private life enables
the liberal state to marginalize religion without eliminating it.45
"Religion, rather than being abolished, becomes a private whim, an
expression of purely subjective, individualized values."46 As one of
the purest contemporary expressions of subjective, impossible-to-con-
firm values, religious belief need not (and, indeed, cannot) be consid-
ered by those who act in public life.47 Liberal government thus treats
religious belief neutrally-as a subjective value preference restricted
to private life, rather than as objective knowledge proper to public
life.48 This position can be genuinely neutral, however, only if the
boundary between the private world of subjective preference and the
public world of objective fact is natural, fixed, and inevitable.
Judges during the liberty-of-contract era did believe that the bound-
ary between public and private life was stable and discoverable by
objective means.49 The natural-law premises of that age suggested
that human activities were inherently public or private. It followed
that all aspects of human life could be identified as properly belonging
to one sphere or to the other by uncovering the essential nature
embedded within any particular human activity.
Few would defend this position today. In the first place, the mod-
em eclipse of natural law by positivism dealt a serious theoretical
blow to the notion that the line between public and private life can be
(identifying and agreeing with traditions and scholars who argue that rationality is an
important component of religious belief); Mensch & Freeman, supra note 39, at 1042-44
(describing the rational aspects of Biblical inerrancy); Myers, supra note 3 (arguing that
secular and religious beliefs with respect to abortion are equally rational).
45 See Marx, supra note 29, at 155 ("Man emancipates himself politically from religion by
banishing it from the sphere of public law to that of private law.").
46 Freeman & Mensch, supra note 20, at 241; see Carter, supra note 2, at 978, 995-96;
Daniel 0. Conkle, Different Religions, Different Politics: Evaluating the Role of Competing
Religious Traditions in American Politics and Law, 10 J.L. & Religion (forthcoming 1992).
47 Cf. Mensch & Freeman, supra note 39, at 1129 (noting that the secular account of
freedom renders theological concerns irrelevant to public policy); Peller, supra note 18, at 1266
("In [materialist] discourse, belief without verification is mere subjectivity or empty formalism,
since the internal coherence of propositions may have no relation to the real world.").
48 Ackerman, supra note 30, at 364 (stating that neutrality marks "the conceptual boundary
on the secular authority of all those who pretend to be God's vice-regent on earth").
49 Mensch, supra note 17, at 17, 20.
1992]
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drawn objectively." More fundamentally, recent developments in
postmodern philosophy and literary criticism have fatally undermined
the epistemological premises of the proposition that substantive
meaning like "public" or "private" resides in the phenomenal world
independent of an act of interpretation.
Prior to these developments, Western intellectual thought from the
time of Descartes had been founded upon a radical distinction
between mind and world. Under this theory, not only do things exist
in the world independent of the human mind, but they are possessed
of an essential character.5 1 Because these essential characteristics
reside in the things themselves, the true nature of something is never a
function of human perception; to the contrary, the truth of human
perception is a function of the true nature of the thing.5 2 Thus, under
the classical Western conception of truth and knowledge, a proposi-
tion is true only to the extent that it corresponds to the world "as-it-
really-is," and one can know something only by understanding the
essential characteristics of that world.53
Philosophers and literary critics have largely abandoned the corre-
spondence theory of truth in favor of theories that do not separate the
observer and the observed.5 4 But without the correspondence theory,
or something like it, it is impossible to determine whether an activity
50 See, e.g., Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v.
Brooks, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1296 (1982).
The positivist cannot invoke the inherently private realm entailed by the very concept of
natural rights. More fundamentally, since any private action acquiesced in by the state
can be seen to derive its power from the state, which is free to withdraw its
authorization at will, positivism potentially implicates the state in every "private"
action not prohibited by law.
Id. at 1301.
51 The classical doctrine of intelligible essences is described in Unger, supra note 21, at 31-
32, 79-80. It is closely related to the metaphysics of presence, which holds that meaning is a
function of some positive attribute that is affirmatively present in the thing or activity being
interpreted. See, e.g., Peller, supra note 18, at 1259-74.
52 See Fritjof Capra, The Tao of Physics 57 (Bantam Books 1977) (1975).
53 For descriptions of the correspondence theory of truth, see Garth L. Hallett, Language
and Truth 5-16 (1988); Perry, supra note 2, at 40-42; Dorothy Grover, Truth and Language-
World Connections, 87 J. Phil. 671, 671-72 (1990).
54 See Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory 143-44 (1983); Hallett, supra note 53, at 17-30;
Perry, supra note 2, at 41; Grover, supra note 53, at 672, 686-87. For an account of this
abandonment, see Allen Thiher, Words in Reflection: Modem Language Theory and
Postmodem Fiction (1984).
[Vol. 78:671
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has been "properly" classified as public or private.55 The public or
private character of an activity depends not on the discovered attrib-
utes of a self-existent world but on the classifier's subjective percep-
tion of that world.
Thus, far from reflecting the world as-it-really-is, the division of
society into public and private life is merely a socially contingent met-
aphor used to ascribe meaning to the world as-we-experience-it.56
Any human activity arguably possesses both a public and a private
dimension. 7 As Louis Seidman has observed, the boundary between
public and private life is not drawn by nature but is instead "a human
construct that must be fought for and quarrelled over."58
Secularism, then, does not mark any natural or inevitable distinc-
tion between private and public life. The confinement of religion to
private life reflects the exercise of contingent social power, not the
disinterested discovery of essential meaning or self-existent reality. 9
III.
The privileging of secular knowledge in public life as objective and
the marginalizing of religious belief in private life as subjective has
been a foundational premise of American jurisprudence under the
Religion Clause of the First Amendment.' Most of the Supreme
55 See generally Unger, supra note 21, at 32 ("If there are no intelligible essences, there is no
predetermined classification of the world.").
56 See id. at 80 ("Because facts have no intrinsic identity, everything depends on the names
we give them."); Peller, supra note 18, at 1178 (" 'Private' relations are 'private' to the extent
that they are represented as not constituted or influenced by 'absent' public or social forces;
'individual will' is 'individual' to the extent that it is self-present and not dependent on the
practices of others.").
57 Freeman & Mensch, supra note 20, at 249-50.
58 Seidman, supra note 23, at 1006.
59 See Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 2, at 123-27. For further discussion of this point, see
Unger, supra note 21, at 80 ("He who has the power to decide what a thing will be called has
the power to decide what it is."); Gary Peller, Reason and the Mob, Tikkun, July/Aug. 1987,
at 28.
The construction of a realm of knowledge separate from superstition and the
identification of a faculty of reason separate from passion was not, after all, simply some
mind game played by philosophers and professional intellectuals. These categories have
always served political roles in differentiating groups as worthy or unworthy and in
justifying particular social hierarchies.
Id.
60 The Religion Clause provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. Const. amend. I.
Virginia Law Review
Court's Religion Clause decisions reflect this elevation of the objec-
tive/secular over the subjective/religious. Two recent decisions-
Edwards v. Aguillard,61 the creation science case decided under the
Establishment Clause, and Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith,62 the Native American peyote case
decided under the Free Exercise Clause-illustrate this
phenomenon.63
A.
In Edwards, the Supreme Court reviewed a Louisiana law that
required public schools to teach creafion science whenever evolution
was taught. Louisiana officially maintained that the law protected
academic freedom and provided for fairness and balance in teaching
schoolchildren about the origin of human life. During the enactment
process, however, the sponsor of the law and several other legislators
had rather indiscreetly stated that they supported the law because cre-
ation science coincided with their religious beliefs, and evolution con-
tradicted those beliefs.64 Relying heavily on a prior decision,
Epperson v. Arkansas,65 the Court held the law invalid under the
Establishment Clause for lack of a secular purpose.66 It found that
the legislative purposes officially articulated by the state were shams
and that the real purpose of the law was to advance fundamentalist
beliefs about divine creation by making the teaching of evolution
more difficult. 67
61 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
62 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
63 Edwards and Smith are particularly good examples of the hostility thesis, but other cases
aptly demonstrate it. For example, many of the themes of Edwards are present in the first
Establishment Clause decision of the modem era, Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947). Similarly, virtually all of the Court's free exercise decisions during the 1980s display a
statist preference for government regulatory interests over religious free exercise. See cases
cited supra note 11.
64 See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586, 592.
65 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (holding that a law forbidding teaching of either evolution or
creationism violates the Establishment Clause for lack of secular purpose).
66 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 593-94.
67 Id. at 586-87.
There is a historic and contemporaneous link between the teachings of certain religious
denominations and the teaching of evolution....
These same historic and contemporaneous antagonisms between the teachings of
certain religious denominations and the teaching of evolution are present in this
case. . . . The legislative history . . . reveals that the term "creation science," as
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The text of Edwards suggested that evolution is a matter of objec-
tive fact, whereas creationism is a matter of subjective belief. The
more general subtext was that science is rational and real, whereas
religion is irrational and imaginary. Throughout the opinion, the
majority described creationism as mere "belief," while it consistently
presented evolution as indisputably real.68
For example, the Court quoted with approval expert testimony to
the effect that "'[a]ny scientific concept that's based on established
fact can be included in [the public school] curriculum.' "69 Similarly,
it criticized the law under review for having given "persuasive advan-
tage to a particular religious doctrine that rejects the factual basis of
evolution in its entirety." 70 The objectivity of evolution assumed by
the Court gives that theory a decisive intellectual advantage over crea-
tionism, such that placing creationism alongside evolution as an equal
or even a superior conception of human origin appears indefensible.
Giving credence to creationism becomes like the medieval church's
stubborn adherence to geocentricity despite Galileo's empirical confir-
mations of the Copernican system.
Accordingly, the Court dismissed without argument testimony
about the empirical basis of creationism.71 It quoted with approval
the determination in Epperson that a decision not to teach any theory
contemplated by the legislature that adopted this Act, embodies the religious belief that
a supernatural creator was responsible for the creation of humankind.
[.. he Act's primary purpose was to change the science curriculum of public
schools in order to provide persuasive advantage to a particular religious doctrine that
rejects the factual basis of evolution in its entirety.
Id. at 590-92; see also id. at 589 ("[IT]he Act does not serve to protect academic freedom, but
has the distinctly different purpose of discrediting 'evolution by counterbalancing its teaching
at every turn with the teaching of creationism .... ' (quoting Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d
1251, 1257 (5th Cir. 1985))).
For succinct overviews of the evolution versus creationism conffict in the context of public
school curricula, see Carter, supra note 2, at 979-85; Mensch & Freeman, supra note 39, at
1034-39.
68 See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585, 591-92.
69 Id. at 587 (emphasis added) (quoting the president of the Louisiana Science Teachers
Association).
70 Id. at 592 (emphasis added).
71 Id. at 591-92. Justice Antonin Scalia summarized the evidence in the record supporting
creationism in his dissent. See id. at 622-25 & n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For an argument
that creationism should be taught as science, see Wendell R. Bird, Note, Freedom of Religion
and Science Instruction in Public Schools, 87 Yale L.J. 515 (1978).
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of human origin was designed to" 'suppress' " evolution 72 and charac-
terized the Louisiana law as "advanc[ing] a religious doctrine by
requiring... the banishment of the theory of evolution from public
school classrooms. '73 By summarily rejecting the possibility that cre-
ationism might be empirically plausible, and by using terms like "sup-
press" and "banish," the Court signaled its view that creationism/
religion censors evolution/knowledge in an oppressive, untruthful
way-through despotic coercion rather than through scientific proof.
The equation of creationism with evolution as an explanation for
human origin evoked the contemporary liberal nightmare of particu-
larist values subverting public life.74 The nightmare is powerful, of
course, because it recalls vivid historical and cultural images in the
post-Enlightenment West: religion as superstition that denies reality
and suppresses truth, together with religion as fanaticism that causes
its adherents to erupt in persecution, violence, and war against all
with whom they disagree.75 These general images from European his-
tory reinforce a specifically American image of religious fundamental-
ists as oppressive and reactionary, suppressing all knowledge that
conflicts with their narrow and literal reading of the Bible.76
Science depends upon the notion of falsifiability for objective proof.
If a hypothesis cannot be empirically tested, it is of little use. Science
discounts creationism because, in answer to every tough question
presented by the data, creationists offer the nonfalsiflable answer,
"God did it." But this dismissive attitude obscures the bias that sci-
ence, and positivism generally, brings to deciding what counts as a
"tough question." For scientists, a tough question is one that cannot
72 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 590 (emphasis added) (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
109 (1968)).
73 Id. at 596 (emphasis added).
74 See Purcell, supra note 24, at 238 (" 'As the religious wars of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries and the ideological purges in contemporary totalitarian societies
indicate, the effort to impose unity of belief in matters of religion and ultimate philosophy, far
from unifying a society, can lead to extraordinary bloodshed and brutality."' (quoting The
Power of the Democratic Idea 17-18 (Sixth Report of the Rockefeller Bros. Fund Special
Studies Project 1960))).
75 See, e.g., William P. Marshall, The Public Square and the Other Side of Religion
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 27, 28 & nn.75-76, on file with the Virginia Law Review
Association).
76 See, e.g., Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103 & n.11, 107 & n.15, 108 & n.16, 109 nn.17-18;
Conkle, supra note 46.
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be explained by reasoning from empirical premises within the frame-
work of the Darwinian paradigm.77
Take, for example, the much discussed "gaps" in the fossil record.
Evolutionists generally assume that human life evolved by random
mutation from less complex forms of life. Crucial episodes along the
evolutionary path, however, seem absent from the geological record.
This fossil gap is a puzzle to be solved, but only because the Darwin-
ian paradigm itself demands some explanation consistent with its gen-
eral hypothesis. For creationists, the gap poses no problem. Rather,
the gap is evidence of the validity of a different paradigm, one that
assumes a master plan implemented by a cosmic creator.7 The whole
thing is neatly circular: An explanation of the fossil gap that is more
or less consistent with the evolutionary paradigm will further validate
that paradigm, but it is the evolutionary paradigm itself that first
defines the gap as a "problem" and then delimits the range of accepta-
ble solutions.79
This conflict between evolution and creationism illustrates Roberto
Unger's antinomy of theory and fact.80 The raw empirical data about
the origin of human life-the so-called "facts"-have no meaning in
and of themselves."1 Only by imposing some order on the data
through use of the evolutionary paradigm do the data come to have
meaning. The different meaning that might come from imposing the
creationist paradigm is rejected because evolution explains the data
"better." But if the data have no meaning independent of the para-
digm imposed on them, how can one discern the greater explanatory
power of one paradigm over another?8 2 "Better" simply means "pref-
77 See generally Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2d ed. 1970)
(arguing that historically the questions that scientists investigate as well as the answers to
those questions have been constituted by the biases of the investigators); Symposium,
Creationism vs. Evolution: Radical Perspectives on the Confrontation of Spirit and Science,
Tikkun, Nov./Dec. 1987, at 55 (making a similar argument in the specific context of
evolution).
78 See, e.g., Gerald L. Schroeder, Genesis and the Big Bang 133-41 (1990).
79 See Kuhn, supra note 77, at 80.
80 See Unger, supra note 21, at 31-36.
81 This is the consequence of modern rejection of the doctrine of intelligible essences. See
supra note 51 and accompanying text.
82 See Ruth A. Putnam, Creating Facts and Values, 60 Phil. 187 (1985).
Every experimenter when he turns to construct a theory to fit his data discards some of
the latter as erroneous; often he can identify a cause (or a likely cause) of the error, but
there are times when data are rejected simply because they do not fit .... At which
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erable" or "more congenial," as in "my paradigm is better than
yours."
The allocation of creationism to the marginalized world of subjec-
tivity, and evolution to the privileged world of objectivity, is merely
the exercise of social power rather than a natural, value-neutral dis-
tinction. Evolution is epistemologically preferred because it does not
appeal to an extraordinary cause like God. But the bias against such
explanations is arbitrary:
The religious person, who is comfortable with the notion of God's
activity and sees God's work all around him every day, finds nothing
incongruous about miraculous events because they are simply another
facet of God's action in the world. In contrast the scientist, who pre-
fers to think of the world as operating according to natural laws,
would regard a miracle as a 'misbehaviour', a pathological event
which mars the elegance and beauty of nature. Miracles are some-
thing that most scientists would rather do without.83
There is no objective justification for privileging evolution over cre-
ationism; the modernist claim to knowledge without bias is false.8 4
Only manipulation of the boundary drawn between public knowledge
and private belief enables the Court to declare evolution the only valid
account of human origin.
point does this sort of thing turn into "the theory justifies the data", thereby
undermining the very integrity of science? At what point do the facts which are to be
the foundation of science turn into fictions?
Id. at 195.
83 Paul Davies, God and the New Physics 197 (1983).
84 See Alan Freeman & Betty Mensch, Religion as Science/Science as Religion:
Constitutional Law and the Fundamentalist Challenge, Tikkun, Nov./Dec. 1987, at 64, 69
("Scientific communities, not unlike their religious counterparts, are hermeneutic endeavors,
communities of tradition organized with reference to authoritative texts. Religious creationists
have their Bible; scientific evolutionists have for their text the rocks. Each community has its
own interpretative criteria, procedures, and conventions, which are ultimately self-
referencing."); Peter Gabel, Creationism and the Spirit of Nature, Tikkun, Nov./Dec. 1987, at
55, 62 ("[I]t would be an unqualified step in the right direction if we abandoned the illusion
that analytical detachment provides us with a privileged form of knowledge...."). Of course,
there is little doubt that, given the opportunity, creationists would attempt to privilege their
account of human origin to the same extent that evolutionists have privileged theirs. See
Freeman & Mensch, supra, at 70.
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B.
In Smith, two Native American drug counselors, who had been
fired by the clinic where they worked for religious use of peyote, were
denied state unemployment compensation. The state of Oregon main-
tained that because use of peyote was criminal conduct under the
state penal code, use of the drug for any reason constituted miscon-
duct for which unemployment benefits could be denied. The counsel-
ors, on the other hand, argued that the Free Exercise Clause
precluded the state from denying them compensation because the act
for which they were dismissed was an element of their religious wor-
ship.85 Abandoning a generation of precedent, 6 the Supreme Court
held in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia that the Free Exercise
Clause does not require that government exempt religious believers
from complying with a generally applicable law that unintentionally
penalizes religious worship.8 7 The Court suggested that such exemp-
tions are not only unworkable but threatening to political order in a
religiously plural society. 8
85 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874-76.
86 The Court did not view its opinion as having departed from prior decisions, maintaining
that it "ha[d] never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with
an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate." Id. at 878-79. It
distinguished Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v.
Review Bd. of the Ind. Security Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) [hereinafter Unemployment Compensation Cases], on the absence of criminal conduct
on the part of the religious objector in those cases, as well as the presence in those cases of a
mechanism for particularized assessment of misconduct. Smith, 494 U.S. at 876-84. It
distinguished Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and its antecedents on the coincidence
of other constitutional rights with the free exercise claim asserted in those cases. Smith, 494
U.S. at 881. Commentators have found this (re)reading of the precedents laughable. See, e.g.,
James D. Gordon, III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 91, 94-99 (1991);
Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 2-3; William P.
Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 308, 309
(1991); Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse,
140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 149, 233-34 (1991).
87 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. "Respondents urge us to hold, quite simply, that when
otherwise prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not only the
convictions but the conduct itself must be free from governmental regulation. We have never
held that, and we decline to do so now." Id.
88 See, e.g., id. at 888 ("[W]e cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as
applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest
of the highest order."); id. at 890 (describing the hardships of minority religions under
generally applicable laws as an "unavoidable consequence of democratic government"); id. at
889-90 n.5 ("[I]t is horrible to contemplate that federal judges will regularly balance against
the importance of general laws the significance of religious practice.").
688 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 78:671
As in Edwards, the specter of social chaos made a crucial early
appearance in Smith. The Court began its analysis by quoting with
approval language from a World War II decision that suggested that
compliance with the law reflects a value higher than religious con-
science. 89 The Court then quoted language from the 1879 case of
Reynolds v. United States90 to the effect that permitting religious
exemptions would lead to anarchy 91 and drew exactly that conclusion
for the contemporary United States.92
These dire warnings of the dangers of free exercise exemptions are
curious because life under the exemption doctrine overruled by the
Court was hardly chaotic. Surprisingly few exemption cases reached
the Supreme Court, and religious objectors lost most of those cases.9 3
89 "Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious
toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the
promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. The mere possession of religious
convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve
the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities .... "
Id. at 879 (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940), overruled by
West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)). Inexplicably, Justice Scalia did
not note that Gobitis was overruled by the Court barely three years after it was decided.
Although one might argue that the foregoing language is still persuasive because it was not
necessary to the Court's holding in Gobitis, the fact that it was written to support a result that
was promptly abandoned undercuts its authority.
90 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
91 "Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary [of generally applicable law] because of
his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious
belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect permit every citizen to become a law
unto himself."
Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67).
92 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.
Any society adopting [the] system [of granting exemptions except in case of a
compelling governmental interest] would be courting anarchy, but that danger increases
in direct proportion to the society's diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination
to coerce or suppress none of them. Precisely because "we are a cosmopolitan nation
made up of people of almost every conceivable religious preference," and precisely
because we value and protect that religious divergence, we cannot afford the luxury of
deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of
conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order.
Id. (citing and quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)). Yet, it has never been
shown that false claims of religious belief are a serious problem outside of tax enforcement.
Even in the area of tax enforcement, the Internal Revenue Service does not seem to have been
unduly hindered by free exercise considerations. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490
U.S. 680 (1989); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); United States v. Sun
Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971 (1984).
93 Compare Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (holding that
denial of unemployment compensation benefits by the state to individuals who refuse to work
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A policy of exemptions could represent a threat to political order only
if one assumes that exemptions would be sought by numerous nonbe-
lievers on the basis of false claims of religious belief and that courts
would be unable to distinguish false claims from sincere ones. Thus,
the Court's fear of political chaos suggests that religion is a taste or
preference that people will affect in order to take advantage of an
exemption from general law.94 The picture of religion that emerges is
that of a cynical, disintegrating force bent on subverting the majesty
of The Law.9"
"Law and order," however, is not a self-defining concept. Absolute
order, or something close to it, might be maintained over short peri-
ods of time by eliminating civil liberties. Presumably the Court does
not intend to gut the entire Bill of Rights. But in any event, what
on religious sabbath violated Free Exercise Clause); Unemployment Compensation Cases,
supra note 86 (same); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish granted exemption
from compulsory high school attendance law) with Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of
Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990) (denying television ministry exemption from general tax on
sales of Bibles); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (denying prison inmates
exemption from policy that prevented them from attending religious worship services);
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (denying orthodox Jewish military officer
exemption from uniform regulation that prevented him from wearing a yarmulke); Jensen v.
Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985), aff'g Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984)
(divided court denying exemption from driver's license photograph requirement to person who
believed photographs were "graven images" in violation of the Ten Commandments); Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (denying religious university exemption from
regulation that denies tax exemption to racially discriminatory educational institutions);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (denying Amish exemption from Social Security
taxes); see also Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (denying orthodox Jewish merchant
exemption from Sunday closing law).
94 Cf. Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 299,
325-26 (suggesting that under the pre-Smith exemption doctrine, the Court denied an
exemption whenever the benefit conferred by exemption might be attractive to large numbers
of people).
9S This image is the likely explanation for the Court's fixation with the criminal character of
peyote use despite its irrelevance to the question of whether persons fired for such use should
receive unemployment benefits under state law. The counselors in Smith were not seeking an
exemption to escape prosecution but only to receive unemployment benefits. Moreover, the
Oregon Supreme Court had determined that the purpose of the "misconduct" provision was
not to reinforce the criminal law but merely to protect the financial integrity of the
unemployment compensation fund. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 875. If the counselors were denied
benefits to protect the fund, then the fact that their dismissal was for prohibited criminal
conduct rather than nonprohibited but civilly actionable conduct is irrelevant, as the Oregon
Supreme Court concluded. See id. The relevant consideration is whether the counselors'
conduct was so widespread as to threaten depletion of the fund if benefits were paid to them
and others similarly situated. See Gordon, supra note 86, at 94-96.
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does "absolute order" mean? Absence of crime? Of political dissent?
Of social diseases like alcoholism, drug addiction, or AIDS? The
Court has chosen one stopping point on an artificial continuum and
denied religious exemptions because they appear to threaten one par-
ticular conception of order.
There are, of course, conceptions of order that religious exemptions
do not threaten. For example, one can easily conceive of a society in
which the religious beliefs of its citizens are taken into account in
assessing guilt or innocence under the criminal law.96 One can even
conceive of order as demanding the opposite of the Court's holding in
Smith. Religious people could be excused from complying with gen-
erally applicable laws that contradict their religious beliefs, as they
could be protected from civil and social penalties for such noncompli-
ance. Formally, at least, this is the regime under which we lived from
1963 to 1990-without anarchy.
Without exemptions, some religious groups will likely be crushed
by the weight of majoritarian law and culture. Such groups pose no
threat to order. However, majoritarian dominance could radicalize
some believers into destabilizing, antisocial activity, including vio-
lence. 97 Thus, the goal of preserving order by refusing to protect
religiously conscientious acts from penalties imposed by generally
applicable laws potentially undermines the very order that a no-
exemption scheme purports to preserve. In the long run, one can con-
ceive of religious exemptions as preserving order as easily as sub-
verting it.98
The Court's conception of order appears most arbitrary in its resur-
rection of the belief-action distinction that first appeared in Reyn-
olds.99 A plausible difference between beliefs and actions can be
96 Cf. John H. Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 Conn. L. Rev.
779, 798-801 (1986) (stating that obedience to religious conscience, like criminal insanity,
places in question whether believers may be held responsible for violations of law committed
while under its influence).
97 Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 2, at 82-91.
98 Cf. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in Treatise of Civil Government and a
Letter Concerning Toleration, supra note 16, at 167, 213-21 (arguing that religious toleration
promotes civil order). Although Locke's appeal for toleration can be used to argue the
advisability of religious exemptions from general law, Locke himself opposed such exemptions.
See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1410, 1433 (1990).
99 See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166 ("Laws are made for the government of actions, and while
they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.").
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maintained only if one limits belief to purely mental activity. But the
Court did not draw the line here, nor could it have: a right that pro-.
tects only belief is not a right. The Court stated that "government
may not compel affirmation of religious belief [or] punish the expres-
sion of religious doctrines it believes to be false.""bco So even the Court
concedes that the Free Exercise Clause protects "pure" religious
speech, including the right not to speak. The act of speaking (or of
not speaking, for that matter), however, is one that affects the world
outside of the mind. Why was the Court willing to protect the act of
speaking but not other acts, like the sacramental smoking of peyote in
the Native American Church?
A well-developed (if somewhat unevenly applied) First Amend-
ment doctrine extends significant protection to "hybrid speech,"
action that includes significant expressive or communicative dimen-
sion.101 Smoking peyote is a positive "expression" of Smith's religious
beliefs, much like burning the flag expresses negative political views
about the United States, or placing a crucifix in a jar of urine
expresses a negative view of Christianity.102 A variety of arguments
have been advanced in favor of outlawing flag desecration and termi-
nating government sponsorship of controversial art, but no one has
(yet) suggested that flagburning and sculpture are wholly unprotected
under the First Amendment because they constitute action rather
than belief. 103
100 Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
101 Compare United States v. Eiehman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990) (burning the American flag
as a political protest is expression protected by the First Amendment); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397 (1989) (same) [hereinafter Flagburning Cases]; Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that high school students who wore black
armbands as an antiwar protest were engaged in expression protected by the First
Amendment) with Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984)
(refusing to protect sleeping in certain national monuments as a constitutionally protected
communication of the plight of the homeless); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)
(refusing to recognize draft-card burning as protected expression protesting the Vietnam war).
For a general discussion of these cases, see Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law
829-30 (2d ed. 1988).
102 But see Marshall, supra note 86, at 313 n.25 (arguing that the religious conduct at issue
in Smith was not expressive).
103 Dan Conkle suggested to me that in one sense this comparison is unfair. The laws
struck down in the Flagburning Cases, supra note 101, were arguably content-specific, directed
at flagburning as a means of expression. An analogous religion-specific law would likewise
violate the Free Exercise Clause even under Smith. However, he suggested that in another
sense, the comparison is fair. When prohibited by a content-neutral general law, such as a
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Why, then, was the Smith Court's conception of order preferable?
Indeed, why was it so clearly preferable that the Court felt confident
in asserting it virtually without argument? The Court invoked the
liberal standby of necessity-that the political order in the United
States will disintegrate without the elimination of religious exemp-
tions. For example, the Court maintained that it would be impossible
to distinguish those who might deserve exemptions, such as the
Amish in Wisconsin v. Yoder," 4 from those who do not. Thus,
exemptions cannot be granted to anyone if order is to be preserved.
Note that the Court did not suggest that the Amish and other reli-
gious objectors are not deserving but only that we cannot tell them
apart from the fakers and charlatans who supposedly would rush to
take advantage of religious exemptions.105
Even granting the Court's premise that the deserving cannot be dis-
tinguished from the undeserving, which is not self-evident, it does not
follow that we should penalize the deserving by indiscriminately
denying exemptions to everyone. One could argue with equal plausi-
bility that we should grant exemptions even to the undeserving. Con-
stitutional law is full of overinclusive rules whose articulation and
application protect undeserving as well as deserving people. Requir-
ing proof of actual malice in libel cases protects The National
Enquirer as well as The New York Times;1 6 the various exclusionary
rules that protect interests under the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments'0 7 probably set free more guilty people than innocent ones; and
freedom of speech protects pornography as well as political speech.108s
These kinds of overbroad constitutional rules presume that the val-
ues the rules protect are so important that it is worth the risk of pro-
tecting some undeserving people precisely to ensure that deserving
local ordinance that regulates outdoor fires, flagburning as expression is still balanced against
the government's general regulatory interests. Smith, on the other hand, refuses to balance
religious exercise against even insignificant regulatory interests.
104 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
105 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 880, 888-90. Smith limits its rhetoric about anarchy to judicial
exemptions and expressly approves legislative exemptions. However, to the extent that false
claims are a problem, they remain so whether the exemptions are granted judicially or
legislatively.
106 See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
107 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
108 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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people are never denied protection.10 9 There is a cost to this, to be
sure, but it is not the breakdown of political order into violence and
chaos. Indeed, the choice is not between order and chaos, but
between different conceptions of order. The Smith Court preferred
the interests of the regulatory state over those of the individual stand-
ing against that state. 110 By falsely presenting statism as the only via-
ble alternative to chaos, the Court avoided explaining why one should
prefer its statist conception of order over a more libertarian
alternative.
IV.
The hallmark of contemporary liberal political theory is neutrality
between competing conceptions of the good."' This means that the
liberal state cannot take a position regarding any claim that cannot be
rationally or empirically demonstrated to be true.' 12 Thus, those who
claim that liberalism is hostile to religion simply have made a cate-
gory mistake. The liberal argument is that because the claims of reli-
gion are not amenable to empirical or rational proof, they are
fundamentally different from the claims of secular ideologies and dis-
ciplines that can be proven rationally or empirically and thus need not
109 See Lawrence G. Sager, State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms and
Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 959 (1985); Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure:
The Legal Status of Underenforeed Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212 (1978).
110 Frederick M. Gedicks, Religious Conservatives Misjudged the Court, Christian Sci.
Monitor, July 18, 1991, at 19 (arguing that the conservative Reagan-Bush Court is statist
rather than libertarian). The Court's preference for statism is, ironically, shared with some
liberals. See, e.g., Richards, supra note 10, at 143 (noting that the pre-Smith exemption
doctrine was motivated by a desire to avoid the "explosive" curtailment of state power); Gey,
supra note 44, at 78 ("[I]f religion is defined broadly enough to encompass all behavior that is
motivated by religion, most activities of the modern regulatory state are thrown into chaos.").
III See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 30, at 10-12; Richards, supra note 10, at 63, 168. But
see, e.g., Stanley Fish, Liberalism Doesn't Exist, 1987 Duke L.J. 997, 1000:
[Liberalism] is a very particular moral agenda (privileging the individual over the
community, the cognitive over the affective, the abstract over the particular) that has
managed, by the very partisan means it claims to transcend, to grab the moral high
ground, and to grab it from a discourse-the discourse of religion-that had held it for
centuries.
The claim that value-neutrality is possible has been repeatedly criticized by Continental philos-
ophers at least since Heidegger. See, e.g., Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method 282-85,
314, 346-49, 358-59 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall rev. trans., 2d rev. ed. Cross-
road Publishing Co. 1990) (1986).
112 Marshall, supra note 9, at 408; see supra text accompanying notes 43-48.
Virginia Law Review [Vol. 78:671
be dealt with in the same way. 113 Secular enterprises yield knowledge,
which the liberal state is bound to accept; religion only yields unprov-
able beliefs about the good, as to which the liberal state must remain
neutral.
Completely captured by the association of secularism with public
life and the confinement of religion to private life, liberals fail to see
how thin the distinction is between knowledge and belief. It never
occurs to them that religious claims might be rational or that secular
claims could be irrational. 4 For example, liberal theorists repeatedly
argue that political deliberations in a liberal democracy must be gov-
erned by critical rationality-that is, citizens in a liberal state should
act only pursuant to empirically plausible reasons." 5 As conceived by
liberals, religion entails unchallengeable commitments born of faith
and extra-rational appeals to transcendent authority. 1 6 Accordingly,
liberals generally disqualify religion from full and uncontroversial
participation in politics because it lacks the participational prerequi-
sites to liberal political dialogue.' 7
113 Gedicks, supra note 33, at 130 ("To say that the government must be neutral between
competing conceptions of the good ... is not to say that it must be neutral between competing
conceptions of Reality.").
114 Id. at 133-37.
115 See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 30, at 81 ("A liberal state exists, in short, only when
actual power relations can be rationalized through Neutral dialogue."); Richards, supra note
10, at 84 ("Equal respect for persons engages... the demands on their common, mutually
cooperative lives that could be justified to the self-determining rational and reasonable powers
of all persons living in community."); Mark G. Yudof, When Government Speaks 32 (1983)
("The ideology of democratic government posits the existence of autonomous citizens who
make informed and intelligent judgments about government policies ... ."); Gey, supra note
44, at 176 ("[S]ome form of rational, critical analysis is the centerpiece of any democratic
project to achieve political and social change."); Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Justice, 39
DePaul L. Rev. 1083, 1090 (1990) ("[Justice requires that public institutions make and justify
decisions on the basis of public reasons."). Republican theorists generally agree. See, e.g.,
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L.J. 1539, 1548-51 (1988)
(describing deliberation as a central tenet of republican theory).
116 See, e.g., Gey, supra note 44, at 173-74; Marshall, supra note 75, at 22-28.
117 See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 216-17 ("The government of a liberal society
knows no religious truth and a crucial premise about a liberal society is that citizens of
extremely diverse religious views can build principles of political order and social justice that
do not depend on particular religious beliefs."); Gey, supra note 44, at 176 ("[R]eligion is
fundamentally incompatible with the critical rationality on which democracy depends.");
Solum, supra note 115, at 1089-92 (conceding that the requirement that judicial decisions be
justified by "public reasons" depends on a politically charged version of the public-private
distinction that confines religion to private life). Professor Greenawalt would allow religious
Hostility to Religion
It seems fair to ask where in the United States such rational deliber-
ative politics are practiced. At the heart of every successful elective
campaign these days lies the creation of photo opportunities and
soundbites. Attractive visual images of the candidate and pithy, styl-
ized quotations from campaign speeches are hardly the stuff of
rational deliberation; on the contrary, they are designed to attract
votes by appealing to the noncognitive, affective aspect of human con-
sciousness. 1 8 At best, it is unclear that politics as usually practiced in
the United States is any more critical and rational than religion. The
liberal belief that reason mediates political conflict is no less a matter
of faith than religious belief in God.1 19
Liberals argue, of course, that rational deliberation is a political
ideal that actual practice only approximates. The presence of uncriti-
cal or extra-rational appeals to the noncognitive hardly proves that
the ideal is an inappropriate goal of politics, even though it may be a
difficult one to achieve. But religion possesses substantial elements of
criticism and rationality and has for centuries. 20 If politics as actu-
ally practiced falls well short of the ideal of critical rationality, and if
religious belief is partially based on reason, on what basis is religion
disfavored in political life?12 1
The hostility to religion that I have described here entails epistemo-
logical and political preferences for secularism that have no ideologi-
cally neutral justification. Liberalism privileges secular ways of
knowing and marginalizes religious ones by manipulating the bound-
ary between public and private life. Liberalism politically privileges
secularism over religion by naming public life (the realm of secular-
discourse in political life only when the question is one in which all participants are relying to a
significant extent on nonpublic justifications. Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 112-13, 144-45.
118 Cf. Tushnet, supra note 24, at 279 ("One method of structuring institutions involves the
use of the noncognitive devices that constitute the art of rhetoric. In this way the republican
tradition is only ambivalently committed to the importance of instrumental rationality."). One
political commentator, however, has recently argued that the success of noncognitive political
campaigning depends on the existence of an underlying cognitive rationality. See Thomas B.
Edsall, Willie Horton's Message, N.Y. Rev. Books, Feb. 13, 1992, at 7, 7-11.
119 Carter, supra note 2, at 987; Fish, supra note 11, at 997.
120 See supra note 44.
121 Cf. Carter, supra note 2, at 989-90 (arguing that liberals think creationism is properly
excluded from the public school science curriculum because it is not based on critical
rationality, yet "very little of the public school curriculum... could fit that description").
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ism) rational and orderly and private life (the realm of religion) irra-
tional and chaotic. 1 22
I have not attempted to deal here with any of the potential ideologi-
cal justifications for either epistemological or political hostility to reli-
gion in American public life. Perhaps such hostility cannot be
avoided, although I doubt this. But even if hostility is unavoidable, it
is nonetheless hostility. Liberals who do not admit as much get a free
rhetorical ride in advocating a secularized public life. It is much eas-
ier to argue, as they do, that liberalism is "neutral" in the conflict
between secularism and religion, than it is to proclaim an epistemo-
logical or political privilege for secularism. Supporting either privi-
lege solely on its own terms is a difficult task, no matter how strong
the imperative. If hostility to religion in public life is indeed the price
that must be paid for a free and democratic society, then that is how
the argument should be framed. But if it is framed in this way, I do
not believe it can succeed.
122 For example, William Marshall agrees that the secularism of public life cannot be
defended on epistemological grounds. Marshall, supra note 75, at 6-9. He defends such
secularism on political grounds, arguing that religion in public life "is potentially
problematic," id. at 9, because religion possesses "an inherent volatility that secular ideologies
do not." Id. at 29-30 n.77. In Marshall's view, the fact that "[t]he fervency of [religious]
beliefs fueled by suppressed fear are easily turned into movements of intolerance, repression,
hate, and persecution" justifies a "special caution" with respect to its involvement in public
life. Id. at 29. Lawrence Solum has made a similar political defense of secularism, arguing
that "religious and other differences make it impossible to reach public agreement about a
comprehensive conception of the good." Solum, supra note 115, at 1087. Thus, in Solum's
view, deliberations in public life must exclude explicitly religious arguments lest we reenact the
religious violence of the Reformation wars. Id. at 1092, 1096-97.
Roger Hendrix and I have argued elsewhere that religion is not unusually destructive
compared to modem secular ideologies. Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 2, at 133-40.
Although we agree with Professors Marshall and Solum that the involvement of religion in
public life presents certain risks, id. at 174-77, 183-84, we dispute both their conclusion that
these risks justify the exclusion of religion from public life, id. at 155-57, and their further
conclusion that the risks are mitigated by such exclusion, id. at 71-72, 76-77, 81-91.
